Abstract. In the United States, housing policies focused on assisting low-income families towards homeownership have resulted in the creation of publicly subsidized affordable mortgage programs. Private lenders and their employees (loan originators) are often the key point of contact to connect low-income borrowers to these public programs.
dearth of research on public service motivation and behavior among private sector employees. In fact, a number of scholars have asked whether or not PSM manifests itself differently in the nonprofit and private sectors as compared to the public sector (Brewer et al. 2000; Gabris and Simo 1995; Wittmer 1991) , but to date, there is little empirical research in this area. The present analysis proposes and tests a model for understanding the role of associations, government perceptions, and shared public values in private sector participation with a public-serving government program.
If we consider Bozeman's (1987) argument that "all organizations are public" then it is important to understand the ways in which organizations outside of the government sector are engaged in public service and advancing public values and the public good. A great deal of public administration research has sought to understand the ways in which public service and public values are driving policy making, program implementation, and product delivery (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Feeney and Bozeman 2007) . This research builds on the public values and public service research and seeks to understand the ways in which public values and public service are articulated through private sector work and action. This research is driven by the research question: What factors (motivators) influence private actors to engage in public service? We answer this question by investigating private sector employees' the motivations for public service among individuals working in the private sector. In particular, we investigate the motivations behind why individuals working in private, for-profit loan originating organizations, known for their efforts to increase profits, might seek out and participate in government programs that aim to serve the public and the public good -with little or no gain to the private organization.
We present an analysis of data drawn from a set of loan originators in Indiana, Florida, and Ohio. These data are derived from an ongoing study of the Mortgage Revenue Bond program, evaluating the relationship between origination practices and borrower outcomes. 1 We begin with a short description of the Mortgage Revenue Bond (MRB) program. Second, we propose three hypotheses that may predict private loan originator participation in the public program and a conceptual Model of Public Service in the Private Sector. Within this discussion we describe some of the literature guiding our hypotheses. Third, we describe the data and methodological approach for testing the hypotheses. We then present the results from the models. We conclude with a discussion of the results and how this research informs our understanding of public service and public values in the private sector.
Mortgage Revenue Bond Lending Program
First initiated in the 1970s by State Housing Finance Agencies, state Mortgage
Revenue Bond (MRB) programs provide reduced interest rate mortgage financing for first time homebuyers with low and moderate incomes meeting program requirements.
2
MRBs are tax-exempt securities issued by state or local housing finance agencies.
Because interest from MRBs is tax exempt, the bonds can be sold to investors at low 1 The project, Mortgage Revenue Bond Program Analysis: Origination Practices and Borrower Outcomes in Ohio, Indiana & Florida, is funded in part through an EDSRG Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2007 . 2 MRB subsidized mortgages are currently restricted by Congress to first time homebuyers (who have not purchased a home in the past three years), earning less than area median income, or less than 115 percent of area median income for families of three or more. Further, the price of homes to be purchased with MRBs is limited to 90 percent of the average purchase price. In 2006, the median income of borrowers assisted with MRB mortgages nationwide was $31,703, which is 65 percent of the national median of 48,451; further, the average purchase price was $132,939, 62 percent of the national median purchase price of $222,000 (NCSHA 2008) .
interest rates and the interest rate savings can be used to offer reduced interest rate mortgages to borrowers, typically originated by private lenders participating in the program. MRBs offer long-term mortgages at below-market rates with the goal of providing affordable homeownership to low-and middle-income first-time homebuyers.
Since its inception, the MRB program has successfully assisted more than 3.6 million lower income households, or about 100,000 new borrowers per year nationwide, making it one of the largest publicly subsidized low income homeownership initiatives. 4 Loan originators are often paid, at least in part, on commission. This commission may be based on a percentage of the total loan amount and/or a factor based on the fees and interest charged on the mortgage.
Understanding this individual discretion-the factors that motivate private sector loan originators to participate more actively in the public MRB program is important not only to understanding and increasing participation in the MRB program specifically, but in understanding private actor participation in public programs generally. We can think of numerous opportunities for private sector enrollment and participation in public programs or initiatives, which may depend more or less on the discretion of individual employees within the private organizations. In the next section we explore theoretical rationales for public service among private sector employees.
Mechanisms of Public Program Participation in Mortgage Lending
We start with the question: Why do some private originating lenders more actively participate in the MRB program than others? Drawing from previous research, we identify three levels, or modalities, of potential influence, that may affect the degree of loan originator participation: geographic, institutional, and individual. While it is the individual level that is of primary interest in this paper, it is necessary to consider (and control for) influence at the other two levels.
First, and most simply, geographic differences (at the local or state level) may directly influence the pool of available borrowers eligible to participate in the MRB 
Individual Public Service in the Private Sector
Taken as a whole, the degree to which a private lending institution participates in the public MRB program may be viewed as an indication of the "publicness" of the lending institution. According to Bozeman (1987 Bozeman ( , 2007 , publicness is the degree to which an organization is constrained or enabled by political authority. Such political authority is generally operationalized at the formal institutional level (from government), such as the percent of funds an organization receives from government, communication with government or degree of regulation from government sources (Bozeman and 5 One exception is the substantial literature on discrimination in mortgage lending, that suggests lending agents (including but not limited to loan originators) may exhibit discretion in approving or denying mortgages (or in soliciting applications) based on race or ethnicity. For a review of this literature, see Ladd (1998) .
Bretschneider 1994; Emmert and Crow 1998; Heinrich and Fournier 2004; Scott and Falcone 1998) . However, in recent conceptualizations, publicness has been enlarged defined to encompass public values more broadly (Antonsen and Jorgensen 1997; Bozeman 2007; Moulton 2009 ), thus expanding from strictly formal institutions of political authority to include less formal institutionalizations of public values that may influence public outcomes. Specifically, the "realized publicness" framework presented by Moulton (2009) suggests that public outcomes may be "realized" through regulative (formal structural), associative (informal networks or community ties) and culturalcognitive (individual perceptions and beliefs) institutions.
While individual loan originators employed with the same lender likely share the same regulative (structural) influences that might determine their public lending behavior, it is likely that there is associative and cultural-cognitive variation at the individual level. This individual variation can be aggregated by organization (i.e., all employees within a given organization) to predict organizational level outcomes; however, if analyzed by individual lending agent, they may help explain individual employee variation in public outcomes-such as public program participation. These associative and cultural-cognitive motivations are thus the primary focus of our analysis.
Associative: Community Ties. Associative influences are related to the relationships of individual loan originators acting in their "official" roles with other entities that do not have formal authority over the individuals, but can exhibit constraint and shape behavior through shared norms, professional networks or ties (Moulton 2009; Powell 1990; Scott 2003) . Like all interorganizational actions, the decision for an employee to engage in public service, or participate in government programs, is embedded in a social network of ongoing personal relationships between individual actors and organizations. If governance emerges from "the values and agreed-upon processes found in social relationships" (Poppo and Zenger 2002, p. 709) , then the decision for an employee to engage in a public program is critically tied to social relationships, or associations.
Private loan originators engage with a variety of actors in their "official" role as lending agents, including realtors, housing counselors, other nonprofit organizations, local government agencies, private businesses, builders and other lenders. Drawing from the literature on social networks (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Uzzi 1999) , there are at least two modalities by which such associations may influence lender participation in the public MRB program. First, the frequency of associations generally (or number of ties) may be associated with an increase in public service. Those loan originators with more connections to their communities, generally, may be more likely to participate in the public MRB program. Second, the types of associations (or the nature of the ties) may be associated with participation in public service. In particular, an increase in the publicness of interactions-or more frequent interaction with more public entities (relative to private entities), may increase a loan originator's participation in the public MRB program.
H1: Respondents with increased frequency of contact with community entities generally will report increased MRB program participation.
H2: Respondents with increased frequency of contact with relatively more public entities will report increased MRB program participation. In addition to the importance of perceptions of government, we expect that positive (or negative) perceptions of the MRB program itself will increase (or decrease) participation in the MRB program. To the extent that loan originators view the MRB program as cumbersome or burdensome, such originators may be less likely to participate in the MRB program. According to Rosenfeld (1984) the growth of government has expanded the amount of detailed guidelines and procedures for decision-making and activities. The sum of these guidelines, procedures, forms, rules, and red-tape serve to increase the administrative burden on public agencies and programs, but also serve as a disincentive for citizens and private actors to engage in relationships with government agencies. 7 . Although research on formalization, rules, and red tape indicates that formal rules and processes can have detrimental effects on organizational commitment and increase role stress and work alienation (Agarwal 1993 ) and decrease organizational performance (Boyne et al 2006) , there is little research focused on how formalization, red tape, and other barriers discourage participation in public programs. We expect that those ranked from one to four as profitability, accountability, reliability, and effectiveness.
. Some researchers go so far as to note that public sector workers are attracted to the public sector because of their desire for intrinsic motivations and a job that values their altruistic needs (Perry and Wise 1990; Vandenabeele et al. 2006) . While research indicates that many public-service minded individuals are attracted to the public sector and public sector employees, on average, have a more public service minded approach to work, there is little research investigating the ways in which shared public values, or the desire to advance the public good, are articluated in the private sector.
Certainly, there are private sector employees who have a strong sense of altruism and a desire to serve less advantaged individuals in our society. In particular, we expect that there are individual loan originators working in the private sector who may exhibit a strong desire to help low-income buyers into affordable home ownership. Especially when we consider the strong cultural value attached to home ownership in the United
States and the numerous affordable lending programs that aim to encourage home ownership, it makes sense that individuals working in private lending organizations understand the positive outcomes and public value of homeownership and the ways in which low-income buyers and communities can benefit from programs aimed to assist with access to affordable home ownership. Thus, we expect that:
H5: Respondents placing higher importance on affordable homeownership for low income borrowers will report increased MRB program participation.
Model of Public Service in the Private Sector
To appropriately test the hypotheses related to individual motivators of public service, it is necessary to account for the geographic and institutional factors that might increase participation in public service programs. Indeed, for any private organization, employee "public behavior" can be appropriately conceptualized within the context of the organization and the context of the geography within which the organization is located. In addition to survey data from loan originators, our analysis incorporates data on county level characteristics from the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. In particular, the average county demographics are computed for the counties served by loan originators (originators were asked to identify the primary counties where they originate mortgages). These county average indicators serve as control variables for the overall analysis.
- Contact Factor explain 64.6 percent of the common variation in the initial correlation matrix of the community ties survey items.
- Table 3 HereWhile motivational differences are the primary independent variables of interest, we also include the educational level (College Degree), community experience (Time Community), and mortgage lending experience (Time Job) of loan officers which may predict participation in the MRB program. 10 Additionally, because it is essential to control the institutional structure within which the originating lender operates we take two approaches. First, we control directly for potential observable variations between institutional structures, including whether or not the lending institution is a depository 9 Frequency of contact choices include: never, less than yearly, yearly, monthly, weekly and daily. 10 The variable College Degree is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent completed a four year degree program. The variables Time Community and Self MRB are measured by the number of years that the respondent reported living in the community and originating MRB mortgages, respectively. Responses were provided in 13 categories, ranging from less than 1 year to more than 20 years, with two years for each category in between. The variable Time Job is measured by the number of years that the respondent reported being employed in their current position in 22 categories, ranging from less than 6 months to more than 20 years with one year for each category in between.
institution (Bank) and thus subject to regulations under the Community Reinvestment Act, as well as the size of the lending institution measured by the number of total lending institution branches nationwide (Lender Large=more than one hundred branches nationwide; Lender Small=fewer than ten branches nationwide). 11 While the benefit of this approach is the ability to discern the varying impact of distinct institutional variables, there is potential that some important components of institutional structure may be overlooked or unmeasured, such as the varying financial compensation to loan originators for various loan types. Second, to account for institutional variation we estimate a fixed effects model that holds institutional differences constant. Unemployment) . 13 We developed control variables to describe the loan originators' geographic service areas by averaging the county characteristics across the counties identified by the lender. Finally, we include dummy variables to identify the state in which the loan originator operates (Indiana, Ohio, and Florida).
11 Lending institution size is typically measured by the asset size of depository lending institutions. However, this asset information is not publicly available for non-bank entities (mortgage companies and brokers), and is further not comparable between bank and non-bank entities. Therefore, the number of offices is included here as a proxy for lending institution size. 12 There are several statistical strategies one can use to estimate fixed effects models. One of the more traditional strategies is to simply include a series of dummy variables representing the lending institutions for which loan originators are employed (with an excluded reference category). There are limitations to interpreting the coefficients directly from an MNL model, as the coefficients themselves are not directly interpretable and are only valid in comparison to the excluded base category. To address these limitations, we provide the exponentiated beta coefficients for each of the model estimates, interpreted as a standard log odds ratio as the change in probability of being in the category of interest versus the base category for a one unit change in the independent variable. Second, and perhaps more helpful, we estimate predicted probabilities for the primary independent variables, or the probability of being in the category of interest for a specified change in the given independent variable, holding all other variables at their respective mean or modal values. Volume. Based on the predicted probabilities on tTable 4B, a one unit increase in the Low Public Contact Factor is associated with an 11 percent increase in the probability of a loan originator originating a moderate portion of MRB loans (5-25%), and an eight percent decrease in the probability of a loan originator originating a high portion of MRB loans (more than 50% of total loan volume). Thus, while we do not find support for hypothesis H1, we find partial support for hypothesis H2 that loan originators who have increased contact with organizations that are "more public" are more likely to participate in the MRB program. This finding points to the importance of understanding the publicness of ties, not just ties between private sector actors and public programs.
Results
Cultural Cognitive: Government Perceptions. We find strong support for the third and fourth hypotheses; that private sector loan originators with more positive perceptions of government generally and the MRB program specifically will report increased MRB program participation. Our models operationalized government perceptions in two ways:
(1) the perception of government as burdensome or less efficient and (2) the perception of the MRB program as more of a hassle than a benefit. We find that a Low Public Factor, or the view that government is burdensome and inefficient, is significantly associated with the probability of originating a low volume of MRB loans, and is negatively associated with the probability of high or very high proportion of MRB loans.
Specifically, a one unit increase in the Low Public Factor is associated with a 12 percent increase in the probability that a loan originator will originate a low proportion of MRB mortgages. Similarly, a one unit increase in the factor for low public is related to a 12 percent decrease in the probability that a loan originator will originate a very high proportion of MRB mortgages (see Ttable 4B). Additionally, the Low MRB Factor, or the perception of the MRB program as more of a hassle than a benefit, is significantly associated with an increase in the probability of originating a low proportion of MRB mortgages. Likewise, the Low MRB Factor is related to a decrease in the probability of originating a high or very high proportion of MRB mortgages. Thus, loan originators' perceptions of government generally (H3) and the MRB program in particular (H4) are significantly related to the degree of lender participation in the MRB program.
Cultural Cognitive: Shared Public Values. We find partial support for our fifth hypothesis--that loan originators with increased desires to serve the public good (originate affordable mortgages to low income borrowers) report increased MRB participation. We operationalized the measure of the individual's desire to serve the public with two measures: Low Income Factor, the perceived importance of low income borrowers and affordable reduced rate financing, and High Cost Factor, the importance of providing high cost mortgages to credit compromised borrowers. As expected, the Low Income Factor is significantly associated with a decrease in a low proportion of MRB mortgages and an increase in a high or very high proportion of MRB mortgages. Loan originators who believe that it is important to provide affordable mortgages to low income borrowers are more likely to originate a higher proportion of MRB mortgages.
The variable High Cost Factor is not statistically significant in the MNL model and does not provide evidence for our fifth hypothesis .
14 We now turn to the remaining control variables in the model. First, the institutional characteristic of whether or not a loan originator is employed with a depository institution (subject to additional regulation, such as the CRA), or Bank, is not significantly related to MRB loan volume. Lender size is slightly positively related to low MRB Loan Volume. Small lenders and larger lenders are both slightly more likely than medium sized lenders to report a low MRB Loan Volume as compared to a medium volume. However, lender size is not significantly related to reporting high or very high
MRB Loan
Volume. This may suggest that there are nuances in the institutional structure and incentives of individual lending institutions that are not captured by the regulatory structure or size of the lending institution. Further investigation into these structural differences is warranted, but is not the primary focus of the present analysis. For this analysis, we are content to control for these differences (through the inclusion of the dummy variables). As shown in Appendix C, many of these fixed effects controls for lending institution are significantly associated with the MRB loan volume of originators.
The control variables describing the geographic location of the loan originator's service area were relatively insignificant predictors of MRB Loan Volume. An increase in the average income of counties served by a loan originator (County Income) is negatively associated with the probability that a loan originator will originate very few MRB mortgages. On the other hand, an increase in the average unemployment rate of the counties served is associated with a decrease in the probability that a loan originator will provide a high proportion of MRB mortgages (relative to the base category, or average proportion of 5-25%). 
Concluding Discussion
Despite its limitations, Tthis research significantly extends the our understanding of public service in the private sector. This analysis finds that in addition to geographic and institutional characteristics, individual characteristics of private loan officers are significantly related to their degree of participation in the MRB program. Much like "street level bureaucrats", private sector employees on the front line may be motivated to and use individual discretion to shape the outcomes of public programs. Specifically, among private loan officers, affinity for government, community ties, and public values are significantly related to the degree of participation in a public serving government program. Thus, the public service behavior of these private actors is not completely determined by their geography or institutional structure; they have discretion to influence public outcomes and the public good.
Second, this analysis lends empirical support for the distinct concepts in our This analysis also finds that Associations (community ties) are comprised of distinct concepts that differently contribute to public program participation. The analysis demonstrates that the publicness of a private lender's associations -not just the number of associations-influence participation in the public program. Specifically, the number of community ties affects participation, but ties to public serving organizations (government and not-for profit) predict very high participation in the program.
In conclusion, the findings from this analysis extend research demonstrating that front line individuals in public organizations have the potential to shape outcomes (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003 Public Values scale items are rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where (1) Strongly Disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly Agree. The survey item for "Low Income Borrowers" reads as follows: "Low income borrowers are an important part of my business". The survey item for "Fixed, Low Interest Rates" reads: "It is very important to provide low income borrowers fixed rate mortgages with low interest rates". The survey item for "Flexible Rates for High Risk" reads: "It very important to offer credit compromised borrowers access to homeownership through the use of flexible interest rates and financing tools". (5) weekly, and (6) daily. Note: Δ Range is the change in predicted probability from the minimum value of X to its maximum value; Δ 1 is the centered change of one unit around the mean; Δ σ is the centered change of one standard deviation around the mean. All other model variables (including those from the full MNL model not shown here) are held at their mean (continuous) or modal (binary) values.
MRB Important
Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: The MRB [Program Name] program provides an important loan product for my borrowers, not provided by other programs.
(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neutral; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree
MRB Hassle
Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The hassle of the MRB [Program Name] program is greater than any benefit it provides to homebuyers.
Public Values Low Income Borrowers
Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: Low income homebuyers are an important part of my business.
Fixed Low Interest Rates
Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is very important to provide low income borrowers fixed rate mortgages with low interest rates.
Flexible Rates for High Risk
Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: It very important to offer credit compromised borrowers access to homeownership through the use of flexible interest rates and financing tools.
Community Ties
In general, how frequently do you have contact (in person, phone or email) with the following types of individuals or organizations related to your role at the lending institution?
(1) Never; (2) Less Than Yearly; (3) Yearly; (4) Monthly; (5) Weekly; (6) Daily
Nonprofit Organizations Housing Counselors Local Government Private Builders Other Lenders Other Private Businesses

